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Stephen A. Saltzburgt
Once again, a Ralph Nader study group has forced us to think
about important questions:I are our antitrust laws adequately enforced,
and if not, why not? Mark Green, the principal author of the new
Nader study group report, The Closed Enterprise System, identifies
a worrisome lack of competition in the United States and attributes to
it staggering effects on the lives of American citizens.2
The basic conclusion of the report is simply that our antitrust laws
do not work,' primarily because there presently exists no effective
means of enforcing the laws vigorously and not because of major de-
fects in the laws themselves. If the report is to be believed, then those
agencies of the federal government entrusted with enforcement power,
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
simply are not vigorous antitrust advocates.
It is urged that because major corporations can obtain the services
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia. A.B. 1967, Dickinson College;
J.D. 1970, University of Pennsylvania.
1 Other well-known study group reports include: R. FFL TH, Tmn INTERSTATE
CO-mMCE- OmsIoN (1970); SowicG THE WnD (H. Wellford ed. 1972).
2 Professor Leff has criticized the "eerie, tired sameness of the book." Leff, Book
Review, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1972, § 7, at 20, col. 4. While it is true that much of the
material on which the study group bases its conclusions has appeared elsewhere before,
the material probably will receive greater public exposure because it is a Nader project.
This makes The Closed Enterprise System important, even if not entirely original.
A second attack made by Professor Leff is more telling: the workmanship of parts
of the book must euphemistically be described as shoddy. This conclusion is probably
correct. At some points the report stoops to the level of needless ad hominem attacks
on former government officials, albeit apologetically in some places. At other points, the
report suggests that complex societal problems can be solved with one stroke of the leg-
islative pen or one thrust of the judicial axe. Such oversimplification and overemphasis
of anecdotal accounts of particular instances in which the government has failed to
prosecute antitrust violations vigorously detract from the worth of the book. In plead-
ing its case, The Closed Enterprise System suffers greatly from its author's intense en-
thusiasm.
Some of the defects of The Closed Enterprise System are understandable. Public
officials are not quick to admit error, nor even to permit private citizens to examine their
conduct. Thus, while the book may sometimes seem onesided with respect to particular
actions or decisions not to act by responsbile authorities, perhaps this single dimension
is better than none at all.
3 While the book often speaks of "the antitrust laws" in general without specifying
the laws to which reference is made, emphasis is placed on three sections of the antitrust
statutes: § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (prohibiting combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade); § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) (pro-
hibiting monopolizing or attempts to monopolize); § 7 of the Celler-Kefauver Anti-
Merger Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) (prohibiting certain mergers or acquisitions the effect
of which "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly").
(176)
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of influential political figures, because they are able to devote tremen-
dous resources to supporting their positions on virtually any issue, and
because elected officials are reluctant to shake up the system with ma-
jor litigation, the Attorney General and his staff at the Department of
Justice are pressured into ignoring antitrust enforcement. 4 The study
group illustrates its view by examining suits by the government for
injunctive relief "to prevent and restrain" violations of the antitrust
laws.' These often end in consent decrees, which, for the most part, are
voluntary settlements that do nothing but bind the defendant to a prom-
ise not to repeat his illegal actions.6 Since the defendant had no legal
right to do the acts in the first place, these decrees win little for the
government that the antitrust laws do not already provide. Moreover,
the defendant who consents to a decree never is forced to admit guilt,
and the public is never certain whether there really has been any illegal
conduct. Hence, there is no stigma attached to the decree. Consent de-
crees are pyrrhic victories for the government, at best. Reliance is also
placed on the paucity of suits, and the argument is made that the im-
portant suits are never brought.7
Unsatisfied with the government's attitude toward civil litigation,
the study group goes on to chastise its approach to civil sanctions. The
group finds that wealthy businessmen are rarely prosecuted for anti-
trust violations; that, if prosecuted, they plead nolo contendere, get
suspended sentences, and return immediately to their jobs; and that
the maximum fine, raised from $5,000 to $50,000,8 is rarely imposed,
4 The recent ITT-Justice Department debacle offers some insight into the problems
that politics provides for antitrust enforcement. For those who found that the underly-
ing facts of the ITT case were obscured by the bizarre personalities involved, these facts
can be reviewed in M. GREEN, TnE CLOSED ENTRzPISE SysTEm 44-45, 102-03 (1972).
5 M. GRzax, supra note 4, at 178. These are very important actions for the govern-
ment. Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970), places an affirmative duty on
the Attorney General to institute actions in equity to prevent and restrain antitrust vio-
lations. In these suits the United States represents the public interest. The United States
may also sue for damages for injuries that it suffers from antitrust violations, but unlike
private citizens it cannot obtain treble damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1970); cf. United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941) (decided prior to enactment of § 15a).
6 See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAW & EcoN. 365,
385-88 (1970).
7The most important example is the failure of the Department to seek deconcentra-
tion of industry-for example, General Motors. M. GREEW, supra note 4, at 250-51. Those
members of the Department's staff who advocate deconcentration suits read § 2 of the
Sherman Act as prohibiting monopolies per se, rather than the act of monopolizing. In
other words, they view the very structure of monopolistic industries as open to attack
regardless of how that structure came about. Neither the language of the statute nor
the cases interpreting it are crystal clear in stating what Congress intended to prohibit,
and the controversy as to what the statute means has been a lively subject of debate.
For a general analysis of the problem, see Johnston & Stevens, Monopoly of Monopoliza-
tion-A Reply to Professor Rostow, 44 ILL. L. Rlv. 269 (1949); Levi, A Two Level
Anti-Monopoly Law, 47 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 567 (1952); Rostow, Monopoly Under the
Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 745 (1949). See also C. KAYsEx & D.
TURNER, ANrzTRusr Poricy 44 (1959); Wilson, The FTC's Deconcentration Case Against
the Breakfast-Cereal Industry: A New "Ballgame" in Antitrust?, 4 ANTITRUST L. &
Ecom. Rzv., Summer 1971, at 57.
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
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and in any event, only represents a drop in the bucket compared to the
illegal profits earned by defendants.
One thing that the report found especially disturbing about the
Department's failure to prosecute antitrust violations vigorously was
that private suits for treble damages have been rendered more difficult.
In the few cases in which the government prosecutes an action to com-
pletion and proves that a violation has occurred, private citizens may
rely on the government's victory as prima facie proof of liability in
their own private actions against the same defendant.9 Seventy-five
percent of private antitrust suits follow successful litigation by the
government. 10 But when a defendant agrees to a consent decree or
pleads nolo contendere, there is no prima facie case of liability in
private actions."
Whereas the report concludes that the enforcement efforts of the
Department of Justice may accurately be described as disappointing, it
finds those of the FTC plainly discouraging. Established in 1914, a
creature of compromise between supporters of big business, who advo-
cated creation of an agency to articulate antitrust standards to guide
corporate officials, and critics of the Justice Department, who wanted
more vigorous enforcement,'" the FTC has never clearly demarcated
its role vis-h-vis antitrust enforcement. The same criticisms made of
the Justice Department are directed at the agency, and the study group
finds the FTC equally guilty.' The report finds especially disappoint-
ing the agency's inability to adjudicate cases faster than the courts.
Having identified what it views as lax enforcement practices, the
study group proceeds to examine the costs. When the antitrust laws
are not working, competition decreases, industries become more con-
centrated, and leading firms gradually acquire monopoly power. Mo-
nopoly power is likely to lead to artificially high prices and restricted
output. 4 It has been estimated that the overall cost of monopoly and
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970).
10 Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments
in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.. 1010, 1060 (1952). A surprising statistic is how
few suits are brought and carried to completion by private citizens following a victory
by the government. It seems apparent that out-of-court settlement and a negotiated
recovery often prove more attractive than the prospect of a full treble damage recovery
after a complete trial.
1115 U.S.C. § 16 (1970).
12 For a brief history of the FTC, see M. GREEN, supra note 4, at 323-33.
13 Cf. E. Cox, R. FELM.ETH & J. Sc=rT'z, Tam NADER REPORT ON ann FEDALr.
TaDnE CoamSissi N (1969); Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. Cr. L. REv.
47 (1969); Simon, The Case Against the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. Car. L. REv.
297 (1952); Comment, The "New" Federal Trade Commission and the Enforcement of
the Antitrust Laws, 65 YALE L.J. 34 (1955).
14See J. BLAIR, EcoNoanc CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE, BEnAvioR AND PUBrac
PoLicY (1971); Machlup, Oligopoly and the Free Society, 1 ANnTRUST L. & EcoN. REv.,
Fall 1967, at 11, 14-20. See also C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 7, at 11-14.
One of the most startling examples of overpricing as a result of antitrust violations
involved the antibiotic tetracycline. As a result of a conspiracy between the nation's
leading drug manufacturers, between 1953 and 1961, 100 tablets sold for about $51. The
study group report indicates that 10 years later, after Congress had investigated the con-
BOOK REVIEW
shared monopoly power in terms of lost production is between $48
billion and $60 billion every year.' 5 In addition to the pure loss of
GNP, it is also estimated that "in any year at least 3 percent of na-
tional income is redistributed mainly toward inequality, because of
market power."'16
The report concludes that there may be other less quantifiable
costs. For example, they rely on the classic work, Antitrust Policy, in
which Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner suggest that three goals of the
antitrust laws are adversely affected by nonenforcement. First, there
is the goal of competition, not as a means of accomplishing other ob-
jectives, but as an end in itself, valued because it substitutes the judg-
ment of the market place for the judgment of big business and thus
provides for society a more acceptable decisionmaker in economic mat-
ters. Second, there is the goal of minimizing the ability of large busi-
nesses to coerce smaller businesses. Finally there remains the aim of
the antitrust laws to insure that social and political power are dis-
tributed somewhat equitably.
17
Still another way in which the evils of concentration may mani-
fest themselves, asserts the report, is in discrimination in hiring, firing,
and promotion in noncompetitive industries. The point seems to be
this: the more power a business has, and the freer it is from competi-
tion, the more likely it is to act arbitrarily.' Concluding that the public
is virtually powerless to change this in the face of the incestuous mar-
riage of politics and big business,' 9 the group warns that reductions
in economic freedoms may become associated with restrictions in po-
litical freedoms 9
The principal answer to these problems offered by the study group
is that the Department of Justice and the FTC should begin to move
to break up (or down) oligopolistic enterprises or shared monopolies.
The recommended focus would be on the structure of industries and
the amount of competition taking place, rather than on individual non-
spiracy and indictments had been handed down, the price for 100 tablets was only $5.
M. GREEN, supra note 4, at 3.
15 The study group extrapolates these figures from studies made by Minnesota Pro-
fessor D. R. Kamerschen, An Estimation of the "Welfare Losses" from Monopoly in the
American Economy, 4 WEST. EcoN. J. 221 (1966) and Michigan State Professor F. M.
Scherer, IDusTuL M =aRx SmRucruRE AND EcoNom'C PEuxoaMAcE (1970). See M.
GREEN, supra note 4, at 14.
16 W. SEPHRD, MAR= PowER Am EcoNoMic WELFARE 212 (1970).
17 C. KAsENs & D. TuRNER, supra note 7, at 18-23.
'8 See Shepherd, Market Power and Racial Discrimination in White-Collar Employ-
ment, 14 ANTITRUST BUi. 141 (1969). See also E. KEFAUVER, IN A FEw HAirDs 168-78
(1965) (citing study by C. Wright Mills).
19 justice Douglas has written recently that "[tihe modem super-corporations ...
wield immense, virtually unchecked power. Some say that they are 'private govern-
ments,' whose decisions affect the lives of us all." SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human
Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 409-10 (1972) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted).
2 0 Machlup, supra note 14, at 12. See also Miller, Toward the "Techno-Corporate"
State?-An Essay in American Constitutionalism, 14 Vnr. L. Rav. 1 (1968).
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competitive acts.2 ' The goal would be the deconcentration of noncom-
petitive industries. 2 In essence, the legal argument made in support of
deconcentration suits is that monopoly power over time, unless result-
ing from an unexpired patent or efficiencies of scale, violates section 2
of the Sherman Act; that, for purposes of antitrust enforcement, the
conduct of all participants in a shared monopoly must be examined
with respect to the group as a whole rather than individual members
thereof; and finally, that a shared monopoly may itself be a per se
violation of section 2.1 There is some support for such suits in the
language of earlier Supreme Court decisions.2 4 But, many lawyers and
economists who share the Nader view that deconcentration is both
necessary and required by the Sherman Act believe that, absent further
legislation, the Supreme Court will find massive deconcentration too
radical an approach to antitrust for the judiciary to initiate. They urge
that deconcentration efforts center on legislation, not adjudication.2 5
While favoring such legislation, and allowing for its possible pass-
age, the study group strongly prefers litigation. In a shared monopoly
society, the group finds it unlikely that politically powerful supercor-
21 M. GREEN, supra note 4, at 144. See Sherman & Tollison, Public Policy Toward
Oligopoly: Dissolution and Sale Economics, 4 ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REV., Summer
1971, at 77; note 8 supra.
22 Mr. justice Brandeis observed that "no monopoly in private industry in America
has yet been attained by efficiency alone." L. BRAN Is, THE CURSE o1 BIGNESS 114
(1934). He went on to say:
It will be found that wherever competition has been suppressed it has been
due either to resort to ruthless processes, or by improper use of inordinate wealth
and power. The attempt to dismember existing illegal trusts is not, therefore, an
attempt to interfere in any way with the natural law of business. It is an
endeavor to restore health by removing a cancer from the body industrial. It is
not an attempt to create competition artificially, but it is the removing of the
obstacle to competition.
Id. 115-16. This would appear to be the study group's view also.
23M. GREEN, supra note 4, at 295-301. When referring to shared monopolies, the
Nader report is speaking of the concentration ratios of industries. They define the term
as a situation in which four or fewer firms supply 50% or more of a particular market.
This is also the manner in which the term is used throughout this review. Senator Philip
Hart has introduced S. 3832, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972): "A BILL To supplement the
antitrust laws, and to protect trade and commerce against oligopoly power or monopoly
power, and for other purposes." It would be illegal under the bill for any corporation
or combination of corporations to possess monopoly power in any line of commerce in
any section of the country or with foreign nations. There is a rebuttable presumption
of monopoly power when a corporation has an excessive rate of return for a period of
years, or if there is no substantial price competition in the line of commerce involved, or
if four or fewer corporations account for 50% or more of sales in any line of commerce.
Senator Hart has indicated that he thinks it will be many years before Congress will
accept such a proposal. Washington Post, July 23, 1972, § A, at 20, col. 2.
24FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) (common course of action); Amer-
ican Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946) ("power exists . . . to
exclude competition when it is desired to do so"); Interstate Circuit Inc. v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (parallel action without formal agreement sufficient to estab-
lish violation); cf. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Services Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395
(1953); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 304 (1949); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).25 See, e.g., C. KAYSEN & D. TUaNER, supra note 7; Harris, The 'New Populism'
and Industrial Reform: The Case for a New Antitrust Law, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECoN.
REv., Summer 1971, at 9. See also L. BRANDEIS, supra, note 22, at 116.
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porations will acquiesce in the speedy passage of meaningful antitrust
legislation. Therefore litigation is the most direct means of attack.
Thus, the report exhorts its readers to press the government to
litigate bigger and better cases.2 6 Apparently there is little, if any,
realization that if business interests can block antitrust legislation, they
also can block lawsuits. Certainly, it is less likely that the executive
branch will take full responsibility for massive antitrust suits than that
it will shift the burden of action to Congress by calling for appropriate
and specific legislation. Having identified a problem of businessmen
controlling government, the study group proceeds to ignore it.
Short shrift is made of private antitrust actions, and this is a
serious error. If the study group has accurately identified the prob-
lems, if its findings of governmental impotence can be believed, and
if its view of the law is correct, then private antitrust litigation, de-
spite its cost, can provide much in the way of needed enforcement.
An example might help to illustrate this point. After he had re-
signed as assistant attorney general in charge of the antitrust division
of the Justice Department, Donald Turner proposed a suit to break up
the Big Three's auto oligopoly. He proposed that a complaint be filed
alleging an individual charge of monopolization against General Mo-
tors; a shared monopoly charge against General Motors, Ford, and
Chrysler; and a charge that the three companies were using illegal
methods of franchising.27 The suit was never filed. Assuming that a
private citizen believes that the suit will never be filed by the govern-
ment, but that it is a suit that has merit and a good chance of winning,
it would appear that he might consider several different kinds of pri-
vate actions.
Assume that A purchases a 1972 Chevrolet in Los Angeles from
a General Motors dealer. A believes that the car is greatly overpriced
and attributes the overpricing to the lack of competition in the auto
industry. It is possible for A to file a class action suit for treble dam-
ages against General Motors, alleging that General Motors shares a
monopoly in the auto industry, that General Motors (and Ford and
Chrysler) performs like a monopolist, and that General Motors has a
history of antitrust violations.28 In supporting his action, A can use
26 M. GREEN, supra note 4, at 30-62, 321-33.
27 Id. 252-53. As might be expected, the study group concluded that the reason such
a suit was not brought was because the government was in the hip pocket of big business.
There may, of course, be other reasons-the suits may be thought to be too disruptive
and the remedies almost impossible. Or, it might be argued that their cost outweighs the
likely benefits. It is significant, however, that government spokesmen have never put for-
ward these reasons to justify inaction. Still, it could be argued that the government has
made a deliberate, conscious and well intentioned decision that deconcentration suits are
more disruptive than they are useful. Aside from the condemning silence on this point,
the fact that legislation would undoubtedly be almost as dislocating makes the argument
that litigation is inadvisable less persuasive. But see note 39 infra. Moreover, there is no
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any theory or argument that the government might have used had it
filed the suit, although it is difficult to know how much more persuasive
a court would find the arguments if urged by the United States. While
it is difficult to predict the exact class that a court would permit A to
represent,2 9 it is very likely that the class would be at least as broad
as all purchasers of autos from General Motors in the Los Angeles
area.
80
Should A succeed in winning, therefore, the recovery on behalf of
the class would indeed be great. A's principal obstacles to victory are
the expense of proving his claim and the enormous delays that he will
undoubtedly face. It is possible, however, that proving his case might
be somewhat easier than proving other antitrust violations like price
fixing.31 With the figures presently available concerning the percentage
each of the Big Three has in the auto industry, and with their clear
history of restrictive practices, this could turn out to be the kind of
suit that is won or lost more on the law than the facts. Still, A will have
to prove the extent of his damages, and this will be no simple task
despite some helpful Supreme Court decisions.82 If A wins, there still
is no deconcentration. A will have succeeded only in imposing a sub-
stantial penalty on General Motors, and even the substantiality of the
penalty pales in comparison with the corporation's sale of autos through-
out the United States. Ford and Chrysler would emerge unscathed.
The results of victory are not entirely satisfactory if A, like the study
group, is a true believer in deconcentration. Yet such a suit is profit-
able and might be valuable in establishing legal doctrine for use in
subsequent litigation.
A might add to his complaint in the aforementioned suit the fol-
'2 9 In the recent case of Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), the Su-
preme Court emphasized the efficacy of class actions in antitrust cases. In Hawaii, the
Court held that § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), did not authorize a state
to sue for treble damages for an injury to its economy. Concerned about the possibility
of double recoveries against defendants, the Court suggested that if class actions, which
do not require a jurisdictional amount and allow recovery of attorney's fees, were not
such a useful remedy, it might be willing to interpret § 4 of the Clayton Act as authoriz-
ing Hawaii's suit. The Court concluded:
Parens patriae actions may, in theory, be related to class actions, but the
latter are definitely preferable in the antitrust area. Rule 23 provides specific rules
for delineating the appropriate plaintiff-class, establishes who is bound by the
action, and effectively prevents duplicative recoveries.
405 U.S. at 266.
8oIt is doubtful that a court would permit the class to grow much larger. See, e.g.,
United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding
that the class of all egg consumers in the country is too large). See also Utah v. American
Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17 (C.D. Cal. 1969); William Goldman Theaters, Inc. v.
Paramount Film Dist. Corp., 49 F.R.D. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
31 See Wilson, supra note 7, at 57, 71-72.
32 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), on
remand, 418 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 321 (1971); Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946), rev'g 150 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1945). See also Story
Parchment Paper Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927). The only way
this type of suit would aid deconcentration efforts is if the recovery in damages was so
great as to drive General Motors to the brink of financial ruin.
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lowing allegations: that he purchases a new car every year; that unless
the market structure is changed he will be forced to bring a new suit
each year to recover damages for overpricing; and, finally, that injunc-
tive relief against future violations is really his only effective remedy.
Such injunctive relief would, of course, require deconcentration of the
industry. Since A's remedy at law may be considered adequate,83 and
since A will be hard put to demonstrate with much certainty that over-
pricing will occur in future years, the extraordinary remedy of injunc-
tive relief will be elusive. 4
If A owns one share of stock in General Motors, he has a third
remedy. He can bring an action alleging that the directors of his cor-
poration are acting in concert with those of Ford and Chrysler to share
an illegal monopoly, and to pray for an appropriate remedial decree.
Case law is far from clear on the point, but there is authority for such
a suit.3 5
Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes the
requirements for bringing a derivative action. 6 If, before bringing his
suit, A requests that the directors voluntarily cease their monopoliza-
tion activities and they refuse, and if A requests that the other share-
33 With respect to an injunction, the Supreme Court has often noted that "tilt is an
elementary principle that, in order to justify the granting of this extraordinary relief, the
complainant's need of it, and the absence of an adequate remedy at law, must dearly
appear." McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 162 (Hughes, J.). It is
clear that normal injunctive principles apply in antitrust cases. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
See also Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments
in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE LJ. 1010, 1021 n.76 (1952).
34 It is by no means certain, however, that A cannot obtain an injunction, since it
is also well established that "[sluch relief is granted to prevent .. . a multiplicity of
suits, or where the injury .. . is such, as from its continuance or permanent mischief,
must occasion constantly recurring grievance .... " Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 616, 621 (1871); cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). Apparently New
York City is seeking such relief in a suit against General Motors that alleges that the
corporation monopolizes the sale of buses for local public transportation. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 5, 1972, at 81, col. 1.
5 In Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731, 734 (2d Cir.
1953), the court said: "Now there does not seem real doubt but that an antitrust deriva-
tive suit will lie; indeed, that seems to follow from the nature of such suits." In Rogers v.
American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962), the Third Circuit agreed with this con-
clusion holding that the derivative suit is a necessary remedy in those cases where the
corporation's directors are themselves implicated in the antitrust violation. Accord, Rams-
burg v. American Investment Co., 231 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1956). The most recent case
on point is Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 436 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1971), where
the court held that a derivative action for damages to the corporation could be main-
tained but found that no damage had been proved.
36 In brief the rule provides that the plaintiff must have been a shareholder of the
corporation at the time of the transaction of which he complains and that his complaint
must allege with particularity "the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the
shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not
making the effort." FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
It is important to note that, as the cause of action arises under a federal statute, fed-
eral law governs the manner in which the case shall be tried. Therefore, matters like
security for costs are resolved by reference to federal statutes and cases in contradistinc-
tion to the manner in which diversity cases are handled under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). Compare Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949),
ith McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961).
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holders take action to stop the continuing monopoly and they refuse,
A will have sufficiently exhausted his corporate remedies. Because
monopolization is a continuing violation, A will be a shareholder at the
time of the wrong of which he complains.3 7 The suit will not be a col-
lusive one to confer jurisdiction since the Clayton Act plainly estab-
lishes a jurisdictional basis for suit.38 Startling though it may be, it
appears that the weight of authority holds that A can bring his action3 9
The foregoing is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of all
possible actions that A might bring; nor is it meant to imply that A
will prevail on the merits. It is only included to suggest that there may
well be new avenues by which staunch supporters of comprehensive
antitrust enforcement can bring their ideas before the courts. Class
actions offer a rich pot for successful litigants, and attorney's fees are
also available to those who prevail on the merits. On the whole, the
judiciary has been quite receptive to novel theories of antitrust lia-
bility. As one plaintiff's lawyer put it: "It has been my experience that
opposing counsel in antitrust cases are harder to convince than
courts.
'40
Perhaps the study group correctly anticipates that the present
Supreme Court will be less vigilant in enforcing the antitrust laws than
the "Warren Court," but this is by no means certain.41 If the study
group correctly interprets section 2 of the Sherman Act as barring
shared monopolies, and if the government is really as anti-antitrust as
the report would have us believe, perhaps there is some great necessity
for increased action by private attorneys general.
37 See, e.g., Palmer v. Morris, 316 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963); Hoff v. Sprayregan, 52
F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Lawson v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 298 F. Supp.
373 (D. Md. 1969); cf. United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957).
3 8 See generally 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcnicE ff 23.1.15[1], at 23.1-51 to -95 (2d
ed. 1969).
39 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), offers support for such a suit in
its suggestion that the class of persons that can seek injunctive relief under the antitrust
laws is broader than the class that can seek damages.
Some undoubtedly will argue that deconcentration should be left to the government
and when the government declines to sue, no litigation should be entertained. This argu-
ment could well prevail, although it may overlook the concept that private citizens stand
as private attorneys general vis-h-vis the antitrust laws to insure that they are enforced.
Private citizens are intended to serve as a check on the government. Another argument
against such suits is that Congress did not intend them. But, a contrary reading of con-
gressional intent may be found in the approval of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
without any express or implied reservations regarding derivative antitrust actions.
This is not to say that litigation is equally as effective or useful as legislation. It is
to say, however, that private citizens may be able to sue when the government does not.
40McConnell, Proof of Damages in an Antitrust Case, 7 ANzrmnsT But'-. 39, 57
(1962).
41 Compare M. Gaxss, supra note 4, at 253, with United States v. Topco Associates,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). Topco held that horizontal territorial divisions of markets
were per se restraints of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. In so holding, the
Court cleared up some of the confusion created by the opinion of justice Fortas in
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), as to whether such restraints had to
be accompanied by price-fixing to be per se violative of the Sherman Act. It is interesting
to note that, contrary to a statement in the dissenting opinion of the Chief justice, there
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In any event, it seems that the theories espoused by the study
group can be tested in court if someone is willing to sue. Because of
the costs of antitrust litigation, it is probably fair to look to the gov-
ernment in the first instance. But, absent government action, it would
seem that some private citizen or citizens would willingly risk the
necessary capital to have their day in court, at least if the law is as
clear and the problems as great as the report indicates. If no one comes
forth, we may have to assume that big business is not only buying off
the government, but the concerned, the adventuresome, and the public
interest bar as well. Or, we may have to conclude that The Closed
Enterprise System overstates its case.
was uncontradicted testimony at the trial in the district court that Topco's territorial
restraints were designed at least in part to control prices and price competition. See
Appendix of Parties, at 184-856. It would seem that in completely ignoring the price-fixing
aspect of the Topco case, the Court made it clear that it was taking an enthusiastic ap-
proach to antitrust enforcement, particularly in view of the fact that the development of
per se rules makes it considerably easier for plaintiffs to win antitrust cases. 1 L.
SCHrWARTZ, FREE ENxRIsE AND ECONOmArc ORGANZATIoN 5 (3d ed. 1966). For further
evidence of the Court's willingness to uphold divestiture, see Ford Motor Co. v. United
States, 405 U.S. 582 (1972).
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